

LIPS2015 Barcelona

Lean in Public Sector Construction Conference

Sesión 6 : ¿Cuál es la mejor manera de repartir riesgos y recompensas?

**Selection of Third-Party Relationships
in Construction:**

Lessons from the Mining Industry

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LO QUE SABEMOS DE HACE YA TIEMPO: Distribución del Riesgo en Proyectos

(Conclusiones de estudio Instituto de la Construcción EE.UU. 1984)



- Una adecuada distribución del riesgo en un contrato tiene un impacto positivo en los resultados del proyecto.
- Cada riesgo tiene su precio, visible u oculto. Los costos visibles aparecen como "imprevistos" o seguros. Sin embargo, condiciones onerosas de los contratos promueven costos ocultos, como por ejemplo:
 - a) El costo de restringir la competencia por el contrato (pocos contratistas interesados);
 - b) El costo de enfrentar más reclamos y disputas;
 - c) El costo de reemplazar contratistas de menor calidad, que probablemente están más dispuestos a aceptar condiciones poco equitativas;
 - d) El costo de una relación antagónica con el contratista en términos de calidad del producto final, facilidad para realizar cambios, reputación y relaciones públicas.




Distribución del Riesgo en Proyectos

(Continuación)

- Los precios de las propuestas son influenciados por la cantidad y calidad de las experiencias que las instituciones, no los individuos, tienen entre ellos.
- Contratos muy riesgosos restringen el numero de proponentes y con ello la competencia por ganarlo.



Selection of Third-Party Relationships in the Mining Industry (Palacios, Alarcón and González 2014)*



(*) Palacios J., Gonzalez V. and Alarcón L.F. (2014) Selection of Third-Party Relationships in Construction. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management-ASCE, 140, 4, B4013005-1-10.



Evolution of Contract Forms

Traditional

Each party has obligations without considering that the relationships in a contract is based on the mutual benefit principle (Ross, 2009)

Partnering

Commitment with the purpose of achieving specific goals of business optimizing effectiveness of each participant's resources (CII, 1991)

Alliance in a project

It takes key elements of Partnering with a philosophy of shared benefits/losses, with a transparency such that it even includes financial aspects



Evolution of Contract Forms

Lean Project Delivery

LPD is an approach that considers a combination of lean principles in production managing and a focus on project development since its concept definition until its final use, maximizing value


Relational Contracts

Based on the recognition of mutual benefits and win-win scenario through higher cooperative relationships between contracting parties




Relational/ Transactional Contracts

Tradicional




Transaccional

Partnering



Transaccional
con Acuerdos

Alliancing



Relacional



Interviews and Cases Studied

| COMPANY | EXECUTIVE LEVEL | SECTOR |
|----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------|
| BHP-BILLITON | Manager Planning and Development | Mining |
| XSTRATA-BECHTEL | Executive General Manager | Mining |
| MINERA LOS PELAMBRES | Manager Planning and Development | Mining |
| KOMATSU CHILE | Gerente de Negocios R&M | Service Provider |
| NORSKE SKOG BIO | Manager of Quality Environment | Manufacturing |
| MAS ERRÁZURIZ | Gerente General | Construcción |



Adoption of lean manufacturing Philosophy adds value

Commitment Chains

Periodical reviews to continuously improve projects

Developing trust allows sharing success and failures and learn from them

| EMPRESA | DIVISIÓN | SECTOR |
|---------------|-------------------------------|------------------------|
| RIO TINTO | Procurement | Provisión de servicios |
| RIO TINTO | Río Tinto Aluminium | Mining |
| RIO TINTO | Río Tinto Carbon Bake Furnace | Mining |
| RIO TINTO | Refinería Comalco Alúmina | Mining |
| SUTTER HEALTH | | Construction |
| VOLSKWAGEN AG | | Automobile |




Actions successfully implemented in mining projects

- Efficient use of resources in a coordinated way and with active collaboration between the parties
- Visual communication that greatly facilitates information transmission between people from different culture and education level
- Coordination that articulates chains of commitment between the participants and ensures its compliance
- Promotion of a project global vision, ensuring systemic improvements instead of local optimization
- Record keeping and revision of lessons learned
- Relation and trust development to share mistakes and learning opportunities




Evolution of Third Party Relationship in Interviewed Companies



- Simultaneous exchange
- Payment for finished products
- Informal agreement based on collaborative commitments
- Common goals
- Formal agreement
- Long term interaction
- Goals alignment




Proposed model to support the Selection of the form of relationship






Factors: Interdependency






Factors : Contractual and Business Aspects






Factors: Risk and reward sharing



Factors: Activity criticality



Relational/Contractual Model Matrix

| Dimensions | | Factors | | Relational/Contractual Managing Strategy | | |
|------------|--------------------------------|---------|--|--|--|-----------------------|
| | | | | Traditional/Transactional | Partnering/Transactional with Agreements | Alliancing/Relational |
| A | Interdependency | A.1 | Collaboration level | Low | Moderate | Very high |
| | | A.2 | Goal alignment | Low | Medium | Very high |
| | | A.3 | Commitment level from the participants | High | Medium | Very high |
| | | A.4 | Trust level from the participants | Low | Medium | Very high |
| | | A.5 | Leadership | Low | medium | Very high |
| | | A.6 | Scope definition | High | Medium | Low |
| | | A.7 | Communication | Limited by contract | Moderate | Very high |
| | | A.8 | Transparency | Limited by contract | Moderate | Very high |
| | | A.9 | Harmony | Limited by contract | Moderate | Very high |
| | | A.10 | Use of information technologies | Limited by contract | Moderate | Very high |
| B | Contractual and of business | B.1 | Contractual relationship | Adverse | Cooperative | Integrated |
| | | B.2 | Duration of the relationship | Indifferent | High | Very high |
| | | B.3 | Flexibility | None | Moderate | Very high |
| | | B.4 | Equity | None | Moderate | Very high |
| | | B.5 | Supply chain | None | Medium | High |
| C | Risks and incentive mechanisms | C.1 | Risk distribution | Transferred | Partial and localized | Equal |
| | | C.2 | Incentive mechanisms | None | Few | Many |
| D | Activity criticality | D.1 | Complexity | Low | Moderate | Very high |
| | | D.2 | External factors | None | Moderate | Very high |
| | | D.3 | Economic value of the transaction | Indifferent | Moderate | Very high |



Conclusions

- Relationship between owner and providers can be managed in a continuum between three relational/contractual managing models: Traditional/Transactional, Partnering/Transactional with agreements and Alliancing/Relational
- The selection of the managing model should be based on the most convenient model for a project according with the ideas and principles that define the way the organization wants to develop its relationship with third parties
- The matrix can be used as a diagnosis tool for contractual relations with third parties as well as a tool to design a desired relationship